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>.ecent U.S. welfare reforms
culminated in the 1996 welfare reform
bill. This bill
changed federal welfare funding
from a matching grant to states to a
fixed block grant,
imposed requirements on states to
increase employment of welfare
recipients or reduce welfare rolls,
gave states greater authority to deny
or cut off welfare benefits, and
forbade (with some exceptions) using
federal dollars to provide welfare to
an individual for more than five years
during that individual's lifetime.
The bill assumes that employment can
and should replace welfare for most
welfare recipients. The bill also assumes
that many welfare recipients can achieve
employment if welfare agencies just give
them a "push."
So far, welfare reform has not been the
disaster that some predicted. As welfare
rolls have declined, employment rates of
less-educated single mothers have
increased (Figure 1). Half of those moved
off welfare gain income, while the other
half lose income (Fraker et al. 1997).
Overall, welfare reform would have to be
given a grade of "B" or "C."
However, a more appropriate grade for
welfare reform might be "incomplete."

Over the next 10 years, the "employment
solution" to welfare faces three
challenges: 1) employing all welfare
recipients who are employable; 2) helping
welfare recipients get and keep good jobs;
and 3) reconstructing a safety net for
those who cannot work.

Jobs for All?
Some time in the next 10 years, it is
likely that the United States will
experience a recession. In some local
labor markets, this recession may be
prolonged. Bad economic times will
increase welfare applications and make it
more difficult for welfare recipients to
find jobs. Furthermore, because current
federal welfare law provides for only a
very limited expansion of funding in
response to a recession, studies suggest
that at least in some states, a recession
will lead to pressure to cut welfare
programs (Levine 1999; Chernick and
McGuire 1999).
To minimize the damage to the poor
caused by recessions, policy should
encourage employment expansion during
recessions, particularly in local labor
markets with high unemployment. One
policy option is a revived New Jobs Tax
Credit (NJTC). In effect in 1977 and
1978, the NJTC provided subsidies for
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Figure 1 Welfare Recipients as a Percentage of Population and the Employment-toPopulation Ratio for Female Heads of Household
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NOTE: Welfare recipients is the number of welfare recipients as a percentage of the total population; data are
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The employment-to-population ratio is for female
heads of household, with other relatives present, ages 16^44, who have less than a college degree; the data
come from the Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group, and were calculated by the author. Note
that because the female heads group is 4 percent of the population, and about half of welfare recipients are in
this group, it is unlikely that all of the female heads who leave welfare actually get a job.

firms that expanded employment above
some baseline level. Evaluations suggest
that the NJTC did increase employment
(Perloff and Wachter 1979; Bishop 1981).
A revived NJTC might be triggered by
high unemployment in a local labor
market; research suggests that
encouraging employment expansion in
high-unemployment areas minimizes
effects on inflation (Bartik 1999). In
addition, we might consider expanding
the federal discretionary fund for welfare
block grants during recessions so that
states would be encouraged to maintain
welfare services.
Even when the economy is booming,
not all welfare recipients who are
potentially employable will get jobs. The
best evidence that demand is inadequate
for the disadvantaged is that programs
that provide guaranteed jobs for
disadvantaged persons usually increase
employment of the target group by 60-70
percent of the program jobs (Bartik
1999).
To reach all welfare recipients who are
potentially employable requires much

more extensive services than the relatively
cheap placement services emphasized by
current welfare reforms. Services might
be needed to enhance labor demand for
welfare recipients, to provide extra
support for increased labor supply of
welfare recipients, and to more
aggressively link labor demand and
supply. Among the services that might be
considered are
more aggressive placement services
that would develop job opportunities
for welfare recipients and screen job
applicants to ensure they are a good
match (e.g., the Minneapolis Neigh
borhood Employment Network;
Molina 1998);
last resort, temporary community ser
vice jobs for welfare recipients in
nonprofit organizations (e.g., the
recent experiment "New Hope";
Poglinco, Brash, and Granger 1998);
employment subsidies, distributed in
a discretionary manner by labor mar
ket intermediaries, to encourage
selected small- and medium-sized
employers to hire screened welfare

recipients (e.g., the Minnesota
MEED program of the 1980s; Rod
1988);
van services, as well as programs to
provide welfare recipients with inex
pensive but reliable cars;
increased funding and better organi
zation of child care subsidies, partic
ularly subsidies to provide back-up
child care services when primary
arrangements fall through.
Will Jobs Pay Off for Welfare
Recipients?
Even if we get welfare recipients into
jobs, we may not reduce poverty, for
several reasons. First, the lack of job
retention by many former welfare
recipients is a major problem. For
example, one welfare-to-work program in
Chicago, Project Match, found that 46
percent of the program's clients lost their
first job by 3 months, 60 percent by 6
months, and 73 percent by 12 months
(Berg, Olson, and Conrad 1991). This job
loss limits work experience and its
consequent wage gains. Less-educated^Bk
and more-educated workers who work ^^
full-time and full-year make comparable
percentage gains in wages (Gladden and
Taber 2000), but because most former
welfare recipients do not consistently
work full-time full-year, real wages for
former welfare recipients typically go up
on average by only 1 or 2 percent per year
(Cancian et al. 1999; Burtless 1995).
So far, policies to increase job
retention appear to have been ineffective.
The Postemployment Services
Demonstration, which tried to increase
job retention for former welfare recipients
by providing intensive case management
services, did not significantly increase
employment of participants (Rangarajan
and Novak 1999). Greater job retention
may require helping employers to
improve their front-line supervision and
mentorship of new hires from the welfare
rolls. Different employers have quite
different job retention success with
welfare recipients. For example, job
retention rates differ greatly with the
industry of the employer (holding wa£
and occupation constant), which may
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fleet different employment practices in
se industries (Bartik 1997).
Another problem for employed exwelfare recipients is that their jobs pay
low wages, typically around $6-7 per
hour (Cancian et al. 1999). Increasing the
minimum wage helps a little, but the
minimum wage increases needed to help a
lot would probably be large enough to
reduce job availability. Increasing the

So far, welfare reform has had it
easy: pushing the most
employable welfare recipients
into a job ... in a booming
economy.
Earned Income Tax Credit further would
also help, but increasing the EITC for
families with children by too much
beyond its current maximum subsidy of
40 percent would be difficult, requiring
either that families remain eligible for the
TC at higher incomes than at present or
posing a higher implicit tax rates as the
higher EITC is more quickly phased out.
A more promising way to increase
wages would be improved training
programs that would enable ex-welfare
recipients to be hired in higher-paying
occupations. A few training programs
have been able to effectively target
higher-paying occupations, for example
the Center for Employment Training
(Melendez 1996) and Project Quest
(Lautsch and Osterman 1998). These
training programs are distinguished by
their focus on particular industry and
occupation sectors, their cultivation of
close ties with employers in designing
their training, their efforts to ensure that
program graduates have the skills that
employers need, and their aggressive
outreach efforts to develop job
opportunities for graduates in the targeted
sectors.
The current "work first" approach to
welfare reform discourages even sixtraining programs. Such training
by some welfare reform
advocates as inequitable compared with
what is available to other low-wage

workers. Training programs may be more
politically viable as part of a workforce
advancement program available to all
low-wage workers. All workers might be
made eligible for larger and more
generous training/education loans to
allow them to take night classes or take
time off for education. Loan terms might
be more generous for lower-income
families. Such loans might be repaid as a
percentage of future income, with loan
repayments collected by the IRS
(Bluestone and Harrison 2000).
Can Everyone Work All the Time?
Another issue is how public policy
should respond to persons who at any
particular time are unable to find a job.
First, there are individuals who
temporarily may be unable to work, either
due to economic conditions or temporary
disabilities. Many low-wage individuals
who lose jobs are ineligible for
unemployment insurance. Federal and
state lifetime limits for welfare receipt
may make hundreds of thousands of
individuals permanently ineligible for
welfare benefits (Duncan et al. 1998;
Moffitt and Pavetti 2000).
We need to recreate some safety net for
these individuals while continuing to
encourage work among welfare
recipients. One policy option is to allow
individuals to over time recover some
eligibility for welfare assistance, for
example allowing one month of
additional welfare eligibility for every one
year off welfare.
Second, physical and mental health
barriers to employment are so extensive
for some welfare recipients that working
successfully in an unsubsidized job is
unlikely. One study found that of welfare
recipients who had 7 or more barriers to
employment out of the 14 barriers
considered (about 3 percent of the welfare
population), only 6 percent were
employed at least 20 hours per week
when contacted 7 to 10 months later
(Danziger et al. 1999). Many of these
individuals should probably be made part
of the disability system.
At the current time, the disability
system in the United States is under
debate. There are financial pressures to

reduce the growth of Social Security
disability and of payments to disabled
persons under the SSI program. In
addition, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) has set up a federal policy that
employers should try to make reasonable
accommodations to allow persons with
disabilities to work. However, the welfare
system has included some individuals
who really cannot work in regular jobs
and should be transferred to the disability
system. Furthermore, some of these
individuals will not be able to work
regularly without extensive
accommodations. If we truly want
everyone to work, this will require very
expensive sheltered workshop jobs. In
some cases, it may be simpler, cheaper,
and fairer to just provide these ex-welfare
recipients with disability payments.
Conclusion
So far, welfare reform has had it easy:
pushing the most employable welfare
recipients into a job, any job, in a
booming economy. The harder
challenges are how to reach the rest of the
welfare recipients, either with a job or
with some sort of safety net or disability
program, and how to get welfare
recipients to get and keep full-time, fullyear jobs with adequate pay. Political
realities suggest that it will be difficult to
develop policies to do this that are not
part of broader policies meant to help
many more persons than just welfare
recipients. An employment policy for
welfare recipients must be part of overall
employment policies that benefit all
Americans who have irregular jobs or low
pay.
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Employment-Related
Child Care Issues
What We Know and What We Do Not
'hild care policy proposals are
floated across the national and state policy
landscape with growing frequency, and
with good reason. An ever-growing
percentage of parents are in the
workforce, with the most recent gains
attributable in part to the decline during
the 1990s in welfare receipt for single
mothers. But even for married mothers
with young children, labor force
participation rates are high, although
many do not work full time or year round.
the demographic group, every
1
Whatever
i
with an employed mother faces a
Umily
myriad of child care choices.
What is the state of knowledge
concerning employment-related child
care issues? What will likely be the
important research and policy issues in
the near future? To provide a broad
overview in response to these questions,
the relevant child care issues can be
grouped into four broad areas: 1) factors
affecting child care costs and the choice
regarding type and place of child care
provider; 2) quality; 3) the direct
relationship between child care prices and
employment behavior; and 4) federal and
state child care spending.
Several factors are important to
parents' choices concerning the child care
provider, where modes of nonparental
care include relative care, family day care
(care in unrelated individuals' homes), or
center-based care. Parents respond to
some unknown subset of quality factors,
including child:adult ratios, caregiver
lining and turnover, consistency of
orals between parents and caregivers,
reliability and convenience of care, and
price. However, the existing literature

«

*

does not explain sufficiently just how
parents are weighing these different
quality factors. There is some evidence
that parents respond to prices when
making modal choices, and an increased
probability of using center-based care is
seen with full-time employment
(Connelly and Kimmel 2000).
Factors affecting child care prices also
have a direct effect on child care quality,
implying that issues 1 and 2 are linked.
The most significant factor in child care
cost is the wages of child care workers,
which by almost any reasonable standard
are notoriously low. As a result, there is
frequent turnover of child care workers,
which negatively affects quality and also
raises costs. And, although many states
impose minimum training and education
requirements of its child care workers in
center-based care, most child care
workers are still untrained in child
development and first aid.
Child care quality concerns include the
measurement of quality, observable
linkages between quality and child
outcomes, and the relationships between
quality, mode, and government
regulation. Regarding the availability and
importance of child care quality, evidence
suggests that in the United States, much
of available child care is of insufficient
quality; see, for example, the report titled
Cost, Quality and Child Outcomes in
Child Care Centers (Helburn et al. 1995).
However, the evidence linking child care
quality and child outcomes is less clear.
Blau (1999) finds little association
between child care quality and child
development on average, and finds
inconsistent effects when focusing on

lower-income children. But recent
findings from the Carolina Abecedarian
Project show long-term positive
development effects, persisting to the age
of 21, of providing particularly highquality child care beginning in infancy to
at-risk children.
The link between state regulations and
child care quality is complex. While
stricter regulations do seem to increase
the quality of care provided by licensed
providers, this increased quality comes
with a higher price tag, resulting in a
decline in the demand for such licensed
care (Hofferth and Chaplin 1998).
The empirical evidence of the
importance of child care costs in the
employment decisions of both married
and single mothers is growing. The bulk
of this evidence suggests differences
across marital status in the responsiveness
of employment to child care prices. Lowincome white single mothers, who devote
up to 30 percent of their incomes to child
care, exhibit relatively greater

The effectiveness of means-tested
child care subsidies could be
improved—and in fact assessed
more concretely—if policy goals
were clarified.

employment responsiveness to child care
prices (Kimmel 1995). Although there is
disagreement in the child care literature
about the magnitude of this employment
response, the evidence is clear that
providing subsidies has a meaningful
impact on work behavior (see, for
example, Kimmel 1998). Child care
prices have differential impacts for fulltime versus part-time workers as well,
with Connelly and Kimmel (2000) finding
that both married and single mothers are
less responsive to child care prices in their
part-time employment choices than in
their full-time employment choices.
Finally, the evidence concerning the
relationship between child care prices and
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the choice of actual hours worked is
weak.
What about federal and state spending
on child care? The availability of child
care subsidies, provided via the income
tax system or more directly to providers
or consumers, can alter the relative supply
and demand for different modes of care
and, as a result, can affect child outcomes
as well as employment of parents. In fact,
tension often arises between the goals
concerning child development and
employment (Blau, forthcoming). Child
care subsidies are also politically
palatable work-tied transfers, raising the
overall standard living of the recipient
families. The effectiveness of meanstested child care subsidies could be
improved and in fact assessed more
concretely if policy goals were clarified
or if key response parameters were
known, including the responses to
subsidies in parents' modal choices and
the responses by suppliers to the
availability of subsidies. Other policy
issues include the appropriate regulation
of providers, the modes of care that
should be subsidized, and the availability
of subsidies to encourage providers to
locate in underserved areas.
Across these four broad areas, other
gaps exist in our current state of
knowledge. A significant portion of the
gap in the child care literature reflects
insufficient knowledge of choices and
behavioral responses for specific
subgroups, particularly the welfare-towork population (Council of Economic
Advisors 1997). We do not know how
this subgroup will care for their children
when faced with inconsistent work
schedules, shift work, and frequent job
changes. We also know very little about
the issues and concerns related to care for
school-aged children, the parental
motivation underlying observed child care
quality choices, and details concerning
differences in child care preferences
across ethnic groups. Also, there is
insufficient research documenting
presumed shortages in specific types of
care (such as infant care and off-hours
care), although some surveys do
document an overall excess demand for
nonparental care of specific types.

We also have insufficient information
regarding quality in the various modes of
care, regardless of how one measures
quality, and the evidence of long-term
effects of poor quality care for the average
child is scant, as is evidence of the link
between child care cost and availability
and school completion (for the latter, see
Kaukmann et al. 2000). Finally, what is
the appropriate expenditure on child care
subsidies? A recent study of welfare
leavers reports that few are receiving
subsidies (Center for Law and Social
Policy 1999), and only 1.24 million of the
approximately 10 million children
eligible for federally funded support
received assistance in 1997 (U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services 1999).
Because of the importance of child
care costs in the low-income working
family's budget and the importance of
child care in welfare reform, policy could
be better informed by data gathered in a
purely experimental context. That
implies some sort of random assignment
experiment in which individuals
(probably recent welfare leavers) are
offered different versions of child care
subsidies, without variation in a broad
package of other benefits, to observe
individuals' willingness to utilize
different versions of subsidies and the
impact of the subsidies on employment
outcomes (Blau, forthcoming).
Unfortunately, one result of welfare
reform is that states are no longer required
to conduct such expensive experiments.
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New Books from the Upjohn Institute
Income Inequality

Bidding for
Business

Metropolitan
Areas

The Efficacy of Local
Economic Development
Incentives in a
Metropolitan Area

Janice F. Madden
University of Pennsylvania

Madden uses data on the 1 82 largest
MSAs to study income redistribution
during the 1980s.
These data allow
wKhtn
her to relate
characteristics of
metropolitan
economies with
significant
changes in income
inequality and
poverty.
She offers statistical analyses on the
relationships between changes during
the 1980s in income inequality, wage
inequality, and poverty rates in MSAs
and what she calls the three "likely
suspects," factors that are most likely
related to changes in income inequality
in metropolitan areas. Those are 1)
demographics, 2) the labor market, and
3) geographic structure, including the
increased locational isolation based on
income or race.
This study is important, says
Madden, because "Knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding changes in
metropolitan income inequality is
essential to our understanding of how
the larger economy affects income
distributions. We cannot respond with
economic or social policies (or even
decide not to respond) to changes in
income inequality or other
metropolitan economic issues without
such knowledge."
186 pp. $34 cloth ISBN 0-88099-204-2
$15 paper ISBN 0-88099-203-4 / 2000

Full text of the first chapters of
these books is available at http://
www.upjohninst.org.

John E. Anderson, University of Nebraska
Robert W. Wassmer
California State University-Sacramento

Anderson and
Wassmer examine
the use and
effectiveness of
local economic
development
incentives within
a specific region,
the Detroit
metropolitan area.
The Detroit area serves as a good
example, they say, because of the
area's 20-plus year track record of its
communities offering the gamut of
economic incentives aimed at
redirecting economic activity and jobs.
The evidence they uncover reveals
factors that drive cities not just in this
southeast Michigan area, but
nationwide to offer particular types
of incentives that are more or less
generous than those offered by their
neighbors.
"Since we know that the fiscal
blight experienced in core cities
relative to periphery cities got no better
over this period (a case could be made
for it getting worse)," say Anderson
and Wassmer, "bidding for business
was the likely reason that periphery
cities used a greater number of
incentives over time."
The authors use this finding and the
results of their simulations to assess
the three policy choices for the future
of local incentive activity in a region:
free choice, elimination, and
regulation.
220 pp. $35 cloth ISBN 0-88099-202-6 / $17
paper ISBN 0-88099-201-8 / 2000

Economic
Conditions and
Welfare Reform
Sheldon H. Danziger, Editor
University of Michigan

Welfare reform is widely touted as
the reason welfare caseloads have
declined rapidly over the last few
years. Apparently, say a group of
researchers, reforms have contributed
to this decline, but so has the booming
economy. If this is true, what will
happen to
caseloads should
the economy enter
a recession, and
what will states do
to confront rising
welfare costs?
The
relationship
between welfare
caseloads and the economy is one of
the key issues addressed in this
important new book. Using the most
current data available, a group of the
nation's leading researchers examines
the effects of welfare reform prior to
and after enactment of the 1996
Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA). What they find is a mixed
picture.
Says Danziger, "Taken together, the
chapters in this volume suggest that, in
its first few years, the 1996 welfare
reform has been more successful in
some dimensions (notably, reducing
caseloads) than in others (raising
disposable income). Much of the
success to date is due to a booming
economy and to a fiscal environment in
which states have more funds to spend
per recipient than they had in the past.
Nonetheless, even under these optimal
economic and fiscal conditions, some
recipients have already 'slipped
through the cracks.'"
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